ALVIN PLANTINGA. Calvin College. Search for more papers by this author. First published: April Full publication history; DOI. I then develop an actualist conception of possible worlds, properties, and essences. In particular, I Alvin Plantinga and Matthew Davidson. Print publication. (In saying that possible worlds are concrete, the possibilist is not saying that they are made of Alvin Plantinga is an actualist who takes worlds to be complex.
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Actualism and Possible Worlds
Donnellan – – Philosophical Review 83 1: Classical, Early, and Medieval Plays and Playwrights: On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions. This distinction is replaced by an allegedly clear distinction between two kinds of existing states of affairs — those that obtain and those that don’t. Alan McMichael – – Philosophical Review 92 1: Print Save Cite Email Share. This of course invites a certain question, namely, just why is it less objectionable to have objects with the latter modal properties than the former one.
Christopher Menzel – – Synthese 85 3: This theory is then to be applied as follows. In putting forward this theory, the actualist takes herself to be replacing an obscure distinction between two modes of being — possible existence and actual existence — with an intelligible distinction.
That the latter distinction is more intelligible than the former ones woelds often just assumed by the actualist without argument.
Furthermore, in putting forward this theory, the actualist has not invoked any objects which have such modal properties as being a possible million carat diamond, being a possible talking donkey, being a possible Alien, etc. In this essay, I defend the compatibility of actualism — i.
Request removal from index. I then develop an actualist conception of possible worlds, properties, and essences. If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian. The Nature of Necessity.
Finally, I provide an actualist understanding of propositions such as there could have an object distinct from each object that actually exists — an understanding that does not commit one to belief in nonexistent objects.
Alvin Plantinga, Actualism and possible worlds – PhilPapers
All Title Author Keyword. This step is, therefore, consistent with Thesis A. Don’t have an account? Mirror Sites View this site from another server: Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Modal Truthmakers and Two Varieties of Actualism.
Presentation. Alvin Plantinga. Actualism and Possible Worlds by Aydin Mohseni on Prezi
actualisk Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality Author s: Christopher Menzel – – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Way Things Were. Finally, I provide an actualist understanding of propositions such as null For the remainder of this essay, then, we assume that some actualist theory of worlds is viable and therefore concentrate our energies solely on the problems that arise in connection possible individuals rather than possible worlds.
Postulating objects with modal properties such as this seems less objectionable to the actualist than postulating objects with the modal properties described at the beginning of this paragraph.
More Like This Show all results sharing this subject: A possible world is a state of affairs that could be such that it includes all and only states of affairs that obtain.
Find it on Scholar. Importantly, note that a state of affairs can exist without obtaining, just as a proposition can exist without being true.
Sign in Create an account. States of affairs, like propositions, are taken to be necessary beings on this account. As an example of actualistically acceptable abstract worlds, we draw chiefly upon Plantinga’s account.
Jeff Speaks – – Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 3: However, again, we will not pursue this question here.